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Our objective is to identify the trading strategy that would allow an investor to take advantage of "excessive"
stock price volatility and "sentiment" fluctuations. We construct a general-equilibrium model of sentiment.
In it, there are two classes of agents and stock prices are excessively volatile because one class is overconfident
about a public signal. As a result, this class of overconfident agents changes its expectations too often,
sometimes being excessively optimistic, sometimes being excessively pessimistic. We determine and
analyze the trading strategy of the rational investors who are not overconfident about the signal. We
find that, because overconfident traders introduce an additional source of risk, rational investors are
deterred by their presence and reduce the proportion of wealth invested into equity except when they
are extremely optimistic about future growth. Moreover, their optimal portfolio strategy is based not
just on a current price divergence but also on their expectation of future sentiment behavior and a prediction
concerning the speed of convergence of prices. Thus, the portfolio strategy includes a protection in
case there is a deviation from that prediction. We find that long maturity bonds are an essential accompaniment
of equity investment, as they serve to hedge this "sentiment risk."
Bernard Dumas
Université de Lausanne















The excess-volatility puzzle – identiﬁed by Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) – points to
a form of market ineﬃciency. But, so far, the investment strategy that would serve to exploit that
form of ineﬃciency and would cause those responsible for excess volatility to part with their wealth
has not been identiﬁed. Suppose that a ﬁnancial market is deemed to be aﬀected by ﬂuctuations
in market “sentiment” so that sentiment volatility causes prices to be more volatile than what
would be justiﬁed by dividend volatility alone.1 Suppose further that a Bayesian, intertemporally
optimizing investor trades in that market. We would like to know what investment policy this
person will undertake in equilibrium.
To address this question, we build a general-equilibrium model of a ﬁnancial market in which a
subpopulation of investors trades on “sentiment” and generates excess volatility. In our model, some
investors are overconﬁdent in the sense that they give too much credence to a public information
signal. One way to capture that behavioral feature has recently been proposed by Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003). In their model of a “tree” economy, a stream of dividends is paid. Some aspect
of the stochastic process of dividends is not observable by anyone. All investors are risk neutral,
are constrained from short selling, and receive information in the form of the current dividend
and some public signals. Agents have diﬀerent beliefs about the correlation between innovations
in the signal and innovations in the unobserved variables: “overconﬁdent”agents are people who
steadfastly believe that this correlation is a positive number when, in fact, it is equal to zero. This
causes them to give too much weight to the signals.
Here, we consider a similar setting except that all investors are risk averse and are allowed to
sell short. One class of agents knows the true correlation. They form “proper” beliefs by using
Bayes’ formula. A second class of investors are overconﬁdent about the public signal. As a result,
they change their beliefs too often about economic prospects: when they receive a signal, they
overreact to it, which then generates excessive stock price movements. We say that volatility is
“excessive” when, for the given utility functions of agents, the level of volatility is larger than it
would be if all agents knew the correlation to be equal to zero, and we refer to the ﬂuctuations in the
1Whether ﬁnancial-market volatility is actually excessive has been debated. The literature on the equity-premium
puzzle has developed a number of models, such as habit-formation models (see Constantinides (1990); Abel (1990);
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), in which the eﬀective discount rate is strongly time varying even though the
consumption stream remains very smooth. Using models of that kind, Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004) have
recently calibrated a model of the U.S. stock market in which the volatility of stock returns is larger than the one
observed in the data. In another line of investigation, Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005)
ﬁnd that allowing for a small long-run predictable component in dividend growth rates and for very high elasticity of
intertemporal substitution can generate several observed asset-pricing phenomenon, including volatility of the market
return. Spiegel (1998) shows that excess volatility can be explained also in an overlapping-generations model with
small shocks to the supply of the multiple risky assets. Bhamra and Uppal (2007) show that diﬀerences in risk
aversions can also lead to large volatility.
1probability beliefs of overconﬁdent agents relative to agents with the proper beliefs as ﬂuctuations
in “sentiment.” The non-zero correlation number to which overconﬁdent investors adhere, is the
single parameter in our model that causes it to diﬀer from a traditional rational-expectations general
equilibrium model.
In their contest with investors who process information rationally under the proper beliefs, we
want the traders who are overconﬁdent to be full-ﬂedged intertemporal optimizers nonetheless. It
is well-known that complete irrationality in the manner of positive “feedback traders” ` a la De Long,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990b) can amplify the volatility of stock prices and that the
additional volatility creates “noise-trader risk” for rational arbitrageurs, thereby creating a limit to
arbitrage. However, feedback traders or traders acting randomly may not be the best representation
of irrational behavior because they are “sitting ducks” for rational investors. Furthermore, it is not
clear where the consumption units they are losing are coming from. For this reason, we prefer to
model a general equilibrium economy where the overconﬁdent traders are intertemporal optimizers
with fully speciﬁed budget constraints, even if they have overconﬁdent beliefs. In this way, welfare
analysis and the analysis of gains and losses of the two groups of traders remain meaningful.2
We identify three distinct aspects of the portfolio strategy of the investors who process infor-
mation properly.3 First, these investors may not agree today with the market about its current
estimate of the growth rate of dividends: there is a diﬀerence of opinion. When the investors with
the proper beliefs are more optimistic than the market, they increase their investment in equity,
while decreasing their investment in bonds (because equity and bonds are positively correlated).
Second, all investors, whether they agree today or not, know that they will revise their forecasts
of growth, with consequent future changes in the rate of interest. Third, if there is a diﬀerence
of opinion today, investors with the proper beliefs are aware that the overconﬁdent investors will
revise their probability beliefs diﬀerently from the way their own will be revised: the diﬀerence
of opinion drives sentiment, which is stochastic, and sentiment risk carries a risk premium. The
second and third eﬀects cause investors with the proper beliefs to hedge; they hold fewer shares of
equity than would be optimal in a market without excess volatility. Thus, our analysis illustrates
how “risk arbitrage” must be based not just on a current price divergence but also on a model of
overconﬁdent behavior, so that a protection can be put in place.
2Models of feedback trading do not discuss the budget constraint of the feedback traders and, therefore, leave
unclear the origin of the gains that the rational arbitrageurs would make. And, even when noise traders pursue an
explicit objective, as is done in De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a), one must be careful not to
confuse “noise risk” with some output risk induced by the noise risk, as has been pointed out recently by Loewenstein
and Willard (2006). Restricting our analysis to a pure exchange general equilibrium economy allows us to maintain
a clean distinction between output risk and noise risk.
3The question being answered in our paper is the same as the one that was raised by Williams (1977) and Ziegler
(2000) in a simpler setting in which the expected growth rate of dividends is constant (although unobserved) and in
which there are fewer securities. In these two papers, the investor whose strategy one is studying is assumed to be of
negligible weight in the market, in contrast to our setting.
2The model we develop can be viewed as an equilibrium model of investor sentiment, in the
sense of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). Several studies have supported the hypothesis that
agents active in the ﬁnancial markets exhibit aspects of behavior that deviate from rationality.4
This was done typically on the basis of some natural experiments, for instance, spin oﬀs, share
repurchases, initial public oﬀerings, reactions to news, etc. In order to sort out which behavioral
aspects actually exist in the marketplace, it would be important to conduct tests using data on asset
prices. One must, therefore, deduce theoretically the behavior of asset prices and portfolio choices
that will prevail in the ﬁnancial markets as a result of a particular deviation from rationality.
That was the intent of three classic papers in this strand of the literature, which can be called
“behavioral equilibrium theory”: Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999). The ﬁrst two of these papers feature a single
group of agents who are non-Bayesian.5 The model of Hong and Stein (1999), like ours, features
two groups of agents with heterogeneous beliefs who, in contrast to the agents in our model, are
not intertemporal optimizers.
The heterogeneity of beliefs between agents needs to be regenerated; otherwise Bayes’ law causes
it to die out.6 There exist basically two ways of doing that: either agents receive diﬀerent informa-
tion or they receive the same information but process it diﬀerently. The ﬁrst, more sophisticated
approach is to let agents receive private signals, as in the vast “Noisy-Rational Expectations” liter-
ature originating from the work of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980) and Wang (1993),
in which agents learn also from price, a channel that is not present in our model. In most renditions
of noisy-rational expectations equilibria, the market includes noise traders who behave randomly,
a feature we would like to avoid. The second approach is the one utilized in “diﬀerence-of-opinion”
models such as Harris and Raviv (1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995), and Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark
(2000); see Morris (1995) for a discussion of this approach. Agents disagree about the basic model
they believe in, or about some ﬁxed model parameter, and they do not learn from each others’ be-
havior: they “agree to disagree”. Under this approach, agents are viewed as being non-Bayesian,7
4For a survey of the behavioral view of asset pricing, see Shefrin (2005).
5The agents in Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) update their beliefs using Bayes’ formula but they do so on
the basis of the wrong prior category of models, which they refuse to update.
6For a comprehensive study of the inﬂuence of heterogeneous beliefs on asset prices, see Basak (2005) and Jouini
and Napp (2006).
7One class of models shows that, with suﬃciently deviant priors, Bayesian, rational learning alone can serve to
develop theoretical models with volatility that matches the data, by assuming that investors do not know the true
stochastic process of dividends (Barsky and De Long (1993)). As investors do not know the expected growth rate of
dividends, prices are revised when they receive information about it. These price revisions go beyond the change in
the current dividend because the current dividend contains information about future dividends. A similar argument
has been made by Bullard and Duﬀy (2001), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), David and Veronesi (2002), Detemple and
Murthy (1994), Duﬃe, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002), Gallmeyer (2000), Timmermann (1993, 1996), and Veronesi
(1999). Brennan and Xia (2001) calibrate a model in which a single type of investors populate the ﬁnancial market and
learn about the expected growth rate of dividends and, separately, about the expected growth rate of consumption.
In that model, as in ours, the expected growth rate of dividends is unobservable and needs to be ﬁltered out, which
3but, one can say equally well, as do Biais and Bossaerts (1998), that agents remain Bayesian and
place inﬁnite trust on some aspect of their prior. The second approach is more easily tractable
while capturing some of the same phenomena as the ﬁrst one. It is the approach we adopt here,
as it has been in the recent, related work of David (2007). In our model, the non-zero correlation
number to which overconﬁdent investors adhere is the mechanism by which heterogeneity of beliefs
is regenerated.
On the technical side, we adopt the exponential linear-quadratic framework, introduced in the
work of Constantinides (1992) on the term structure, in the work of Kim and Omberg (1996) on
dynamic portfolio choice, and now extensively used in term-structure and volatility modeling (see
Cheng and Scaillet (2006)). It is a very ﬂexible functional setting in that it can handle any ﬁnite
number of state variables. In our model, asset prices are weighted averages of exponential linear-
quadratic functions of state variables, with time varying weights. Ours is, to our knowledge, the
ﬁrst general-equilibrium application of that mathematical framework.
The balance of this paper covers the following material. In Section 2, we describe agents’ beliefs
and the way beliefs evolve over time. In Section 3, we determine the equilibrium allocation of
consumption and the equilibrium pricing kernel. In Section 4, we produce the explicit solution for
all securities prices. In Section 5, we derive and study the diﬀusion matrix and all moments of
securities prices; we verify, of course, that overconﬁdent investors bring about excessive volatility.
In Section 6, we identify the main factors driving the portfolio strategy of the rational trader and we
show how it can be implemented via trading in stocks and bonds, as functions of the values of the
fundamental state variables of the economy. In Section 7, we explain the link that exists between
the portfolio strategy and the trader’s ability to predict returns in the long run. In Section 8,
we derive the speed of impoverishment of the overconﬁdent traders and demonstrate that excess
volatility may be a long-lived phenomenon. Section 9 contains the conclusion. Throughout, we
highlight our main results in propositions while technical results are presented in lemmas, with
their mathematical derivations provided in the appendix.
2 Beliefs and information structure
We wish to develop a dynamic general-equilibrium model where investors have heterogeneous expec-
tations about some aspect of the economy. In the ﬁrst subsection below, we specify an endowment
economy populated by two groups of investors, Group A and Group B, who harbor diﬀerent expec-
tations about the process driving aggregate dividends. In the second subsection, we show that the
then contributes positively to the volatility of the stock price. They ﬁnd that they can match several moments of
stock returns.
4dynamics of expectations that we have speciﬁed can be viewed as the result of a learning process
of the kind proposed by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
2.1 Beliefs and their dynamics
We consider an economy with an aggregate dividend-ﬂow diﬀusion process {δt}, which we regard
as the “fundamental” variable.
Assumption 1 Under the beliefs of Group B, the process for aggregate dividends is driven by the
following pair of stochastic diﬀerential equations, which deﬁnes a Markovian system in two state



















δ is a one-dimensional process that is Brownian under the probability measure that reﬂects
the expectations of Group B.
From Equation (1), we see that b fB
t is the growth rate of δ conditionally expected by Group B
and Equation (2) postulates that this expected growth rate follows a mean reverting Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process, with the mean-reverting parameter given by ζ > 0. The coeﬃcients γB and σδ
are assumed to be positive and constant. An interpretation of γB is given in the next subsection.
We refer to the pair of equations (1)–(2) as the “fundamental system”.
Our economy is a heterogeneous-expectations economy, where the belief of Group A about the
expected growth rate of aggregate dividends diﬀers from that of Group B.
Assumption 2 Group A believes that the expected growth rate of aggregate dividends is equal to:
b fA
t = b fB
t − b gt. (3)
Hence b gt is the “diﬀerence of opinion”. The dynamics of the diﬀerence of opinion are speciﬁed to
follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that mean reverts (ψ > 0) to zero:
db gt = −ψb gtdt + σb g,δdWB
δ,t + σb g,sdWB
s,t, (4)
σb g,δ ≥ 0; σb g,s ≤ 0.
where WB
s is a second one-dimensional process, independent of Wδ, that is Brownian under the
probability measure that reﬂects the expectations of Group B.
5In the equation above, the volatilities σb g,δ and σb g,s are constant with the signs postulated. An
interpretation for them and a justiﬁcation for the sign assumptions are given in the next subsection.
Because of the diﬀerence of opinion about the conditionally expected growth rate of aggregate
dividends, the two groups have diﬀerent probability beliefs:
Assumption 3 Group A diﬀers from Group B in its beliefs about the aggregate dividends process.
Group A’s probability beliefs at time t are represented by a change of measure η, where {ηt} is a
strictly positive martingale process. For any event eu belonging to the σ-algebra of time u, we have:
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In the eyes of Group B, η captures the way in which Group A’s probability beliefs diﬀer from
theirs. We call η the “sentiment” variable. Girsanov’s theorem tells us how the diﬀerence of
opinion gets encoded into η to generate diﬀerent probability beliefs. When Group B is currently
comparatively pessimistic (b gt < 0), Group A views positive innovations in δ (or s) as more probable
than Group B does. This, from Girsanov’s theorem, implies positive innovations in the change of









We refer to the pair of equations (4)–(6) as the “sentiment system”.
The joint dynamics of the four state variables, {δ,η, b fB,b g}, in the eyes of Group B are com-
pletely characterized by the Markovian system (1), (2), (4), and (6). Three of the four state
variables, namely δ,η and b fB, are always perfectly correlated, but δ and b fB are always positively
correlated with each other, while the diﬀusion vector of η has the sign opposite to the sign of b g.
Of these four state variables, two will have a direct, immediate eﬀect on the economy. They are
the fundamental, δ, and the sentiment, η. The fundamental moves independently of sentiment
but sentiment is correlated with the fundamental for reasons that will be made clear shortly. The
other two state variables, b fB and b g, have only an indirect eﬀect in that they solely act on the ﬁrst
two: b fB is the current estimate of the drift of δ by Population B, and the diﬀerence of opinion, b g,
determines the diﬀusion of sentiment, η. Functionally speaking, the “fundamental system” (1)–(2)
and the “sentiment system” (4)–(6) are unrelated to each other but they are correlated. Instanta-
neously, the four state variables, {δ, b fB,η,b g}, which are driven by only two Brownians, WB
δ and
6WB
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In summary, there are two distinct eﬀects of heterogeneous beliefs and their dynamics.8 One
determines the volatility of sentiment, the other the volatility of volatility of sentiment so that, in
essence, our model is a model of stochastic volatility in a state variable. The diﬀerence of opinion b g
scales the diﬀusion of η, which implies that η has a diﬀusion that can take large positive or negative
values. Sentiment or heterogeneity of beliefs, η, is volatile. This ﬁrst eﬀect is cumulative over time,
or long term. Second, the diﬀerence of opinion, b g, itself is stochastic. Even when the two groups of
investors happen to agree today about the growth rate of aggregate dividends (b g = 0), all investors
still know that they will revise their future estimates of the growth rate, and that they will do so in
diﬀerent ways, so that they will not agree tomorrow. This second eﬀect (the eﬀect of the dynamics
of heterogeneous beliefs) is instantaneous or short-term.




date t, we shall have occasion in Section 7 to use Malliavin calculus, which is a form of calculus
that tells how shocks occurring today aﬀect the values of variables in the distant future.
2.2 An information-processing interpretation for the formation of beliefs
In the previous subsection, the dynamics for the beliefs of the two agents are speciﬁed exogenously.
In this subsection, we show that these dynamics can be viewed as being the result of a learning
process similar to that proposed by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
We start by re-specifying the process for aggregate dividends δ under the eﬀective measure.
Assumption 10 The stochastic process for δ is:
dδt
δt
= ftdt + σδdZδ
t , (8)
where Zδ is a Brownian under the eﬀective probability measure, which governs empirical realizations
of the process. The conditional expected growth rate of aggregate dividends, ft, behaves according
8We emphasize that two state variables, b g and η, are needed in our Markovian formulation to capture the dynamics
of heterogeneous beliefs and their eﬀects, unlike what happens in, e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). As is








t ; ζ > 0, (9)
where Zf is a Brownian under the eﬀective probability measure.
We assume that the conditional expected growth rate of dividends, f, is not observed by any
agent, and thus, must be estimated by them.
Assumption 20 All investors estimate, or ﬁlter out, the current value of f and its future behavior
using the observation of the current dividend, δ, and the observation of a public signal, s, which
has the following process:9
dst = σsdZs
t, (10)
where Zs is a third Brownian under the objective probability measure as well.
All three Brownians, {Zδ,Zf,Zs}, are uncorrelated with each other (under the objective prob-
ability measure and any measure equivalent to it) so that, instantaneously, innovations dZs in the
signal convey no information about innovations dZf in the unobserved variable. That is, the signal
is pure noise.
Finally, we assume that agents in Group A are overconﬁdent about the signal while agents in
Group B are not.
Assumption 30 Agents in Group A perform their ﬁltering under the overconﬁdent belief that the
signal, s, has positive correlation φ ∈ [0,1] with f when, in fact, it has zero correlation. The







Group B, on the other hand, believes properly that the true correlation is zero.
Now, because of the assumed nonzero correlation φ in the eyes of Group A, the signal provides
the agents of that group with short-run, albeit false, information about the current shock to the
dividend growth rate.
This single number φ, which we call the “overconﬁdence coeﬃcient”, parameterizes the degree
of excess conﬁdence placed in the signal by Group A. It could be argued that overconﬁdent agents
9Note that the process speciﬁed for the signal has only a diﬀusion term but no drift term. We choose this
speciﬁcation because it makes it easier to interpret the results. For the case where the signal has also a drift term,
we refer the reader to earlier versions of this paper.
8should gradually detect from their empirically-realized consumption losses that their beliefs are
overconﬁdent. We do not address this issue, but in Section 8 we show that the consumption losses
of the overconﬁdent group are “so gradual” that detection may be diﬃcult.
From ﬁltering theory (see Lipster and Shiryaev (2001, Theorem 12.7, page 36)), the conditional
expected values, b fA and b fB, of f according to individuals of Group A (φ 6= 0) and Group B obey






































The numbers γA and γB are the steady-state variances of f as estimated by Group A and B re-
spectively.11 These variances would normally be deterministic functions of time. But for simplicity
we assume, as did Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), that there has been a suﬃciently long period of
learning for people of both groups to converge to their level of variance, irrespective of their prior.
In our model, no agent knows the true state of the economy. Hence, the objective measure
is not deﬁned on either agent’s σ-algebra and we can ignore it for the purpose of calculating the
equilibrium. In the previous subsection, we wrote the above stochastic diﬀerential equations directly
in terms of processes that are Brownian motions under subjective probability measures. We have




Based on Assumptions 10–30, the following lemma gives the relation between the speciﬁcation
of the model in the previous subsection and this subsection.
10Observe once again that output δ serves as a signal, which causes an update of the growth rate of output, just
as the signal s does.
































As has been pointed out by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), γ
A decreases as φ rises, which is the reason for which
Group A is called “overconﬁdent”. γ
A starts at the value γ
B when φ = 0 and would reach γ
A = 0 when φ → 1. The
signal can lead Group A ultimately to complete (and foolish) unconditional certainty.
9Lemma 2 In Equation (4) the mean-reversion parameter for the diﬀerence-of-opinion process, ψ,
and the volatilities, σb g,δ and σb g,s, are given by:









σb g,s = −φσf ≤ 0. (17)
From the above lemma, we see that the mean-reversion parameter, ψ, is positive. The diﬀusion
coeﬃcients have the property that σb g,δ ≥ 0 and σb g,s ≤ 0. Moreover, both coeﬃcients are equal
to zero when the overconﬁdence coeﬃcient φ takes the value zero so that b g has zero diﬀusion and
the rank of the diﬀusion matrix drops from 2 to 1. This is because, in that case, signal shocks are
ignored by all.
3 Equilibrium allocation of consumption and pricing
We are interested in the interaction between two groups, who harbor diﬀerent and evolving ex-
pectations. Diﬀerences in risk aversion and diﬀerences in the rate of impatience are not our main
focus. So, we restrict our analysis to the setting in which
Assumption 4 Both groups have power utility with the same risk aversion, 1 − α, and rate of
impatience, ρ.
3.1 The individual’s optimization problem
Assuming a complete ﬁnancial market,12 we can use the martingale, “static” formulation (as done
in Cox and Huang (1989) and Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve (1987)). Then, the problem of












dt; α < 1, (18)













12David (2007) says that the ﬂuctuating diﬀerence of measure η between the two groups makes the market “eﬀec-
tively incomplete”. That is a matter of semantics. Analytically, the equilibrium can be obtained by complete-market
methods. It would probably be more descriptive of the analytical structure that is reﬂected in Equation (21) below,
to say that the ﬂuctuating η causes the utility function of agents A to become “eﬀectively state dependent” (i.e. non
von Neuman-Morgenstern) relative to the probability measure of Group B. See Riedel (2001).
10where ξB is the change of measure from Group B’s probability measure to the risk neutralized
measure (which we determine in the next subsection) and θ
B
is the share of equity with which B
is initially endowed. The ﬁrst-order condition for consumption equates marginal utility to λBξB
t ,







Group A holds an initial share θ
A
= 1 − θ
B
of the equity and faces an analogous optimization
problem. The only diﬀerence is that Group A uses a probability measure that is diﬀerent from that

































where λA is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint (22).
3.2 Equilibrium pricing measure
An equilibrium is a price system and a pair of consumption-portfolio processes such that: (i) in-
vestors choose optimally their consumption-portfolio strategies, given their perceived price pro-
cesses; (ii) the perceived security price processes are consistent across investors; and (iii) commodity
and securities markets clear.











α−1 = δt. (24)
Solving this equation:
ξB















13We could also have deﬁned ξ
A, the density that makes prices martingales under A’s probability measure. For















, which implies that ξ
B = ηξ
A. The martingale pricing density




t = ω(ηt)δt, (26)
cB



















is the share of consumption of Group A.15 The consumption-sharing rule is linear in δ because both
groups have the same risk aversion. But its slope is stochastic because the share of consumption
allocated to each group, ω(η), is driven by sentiment, η.
The equilibrium value of ξB – the martingale pricing density under B’s probability measure –
depends on η, the probability density of A relative to B, that is, sentiment. In addition to reﬂecting
the abundance or scarcity of goods, as is usual in the absence of state preference or heterogeneous
beliefs, the state prices also incorporate a power (or H¨ older) average of the probability beliefs of
the two groups (given by the term that is in square brackets in Equation (25)). As η ﬂuctuates,
average probability belief or “sentiment” ﬂuctuates with it. In writing his/her budget constraint
based on ξB, Agent B anticipates A’s beliefs. This reﬂects “higher-order beliefs.”
Notice in Equation (25) that the functional forms of ξB with respect to δ and with respect to η
are very diﬀerent from each other. This is because fundamental risk and sentiment risk have very
diﬀerent economic eﬀects on utility and marginal utility. From Equation (25), one can show that
the ﬁrst derivative of ξB (δ,η) with respect to δ is negative while the second derivative is positive.
The second derivative of the function ξB (δ,η) with respect to η has the same sign as α. The cross
derivative of the function ξB (δ,η) is unambiguously negative. These derivatives have the following
economic interpretation.
The fundamental, δ, has the customary aggregate eﬀect on both groups: when output increases,
marginal utility decreases. Thus, an increase in future expected output decreases the expected value
of discount factors. Furthermore, marginal utility is convex with respect to δ. Jensen’s inequality
implies that an increase in fundamental risk increases the expected value of discount factors, which
is the familiar precautionary-saving motive.16
14For arbitrary (but von Neuman Morgenstern) utility, ω would be deﬁned as the ratio of Group A’s absolute risk
tolerance over the sum of absolute risk tolerances of Group A and Group B. See Lintner (1969) and Basak (2005).
In the isoelastic case, this ratio reduces to the share of consumption.
15Along any sample path of the economy, ω(η) is monotonically increasing with η. Thus, we can use ω as a
representation of η. As state variable, η is equivalent to the consumption shares of the two subpopulations.
16For arbitrary (but von Neuman Morgenstern) utility, the curvature of ξ
B with respect to the fundamental δ is
equal to total absolute risk aversion multiplied by total absolute prudence. See Basak (2005).
12In contrast to the fundamental, which is an aggregate shock, sentiment acts as a wedge between
the two groups.17 Because the second derivative of ξB (δ,η) with respect to η has the same sign as
α, if α < 0 (risk aversion greater than 1), discount factors are concave with respect to η so that an
increase in sentiment risk (the variance of η), by Jensen’s inequality, reduces the expected values
of all the future stochastic discount factors written with respect to B’s measure.
3.3 Securities-market implementation of the complete-market equilibrium
Because there are two Brownians that agents care about, WB
δ and WB
s , three securities that are
linearly independent are required to complete ﬁnancial markets and implement the equilibrium.
The choice of securities is arbitrary. We assume that there is a riskless, instantaneous bank deposit
with a rate of interest r. The second security, equity or total wealth, pays the aggregate dividend
δ perpetually. The third security we introduce is a perpetual bond paying continuously and indef-
initely a coupon equal to one unit of consumption per unit of time. We shall denote the price at
date t of the bond as Pt and the price of equity as Ft.
The equilibrium price of a ﬁxed-income bond, which we denote by P, can be obtained directly

















Similarly, the equilibrium price of long-lived equity is the discounted sum of all future dividends.
This is also the total wealth of the economy, which we denote by F:
F
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We shall also have occasion to refer to the single-payoﬀ versions of these securities, in which case
we shall add a superscript T for the maturity date of the payoﬀ. So, for instance, the price today
of a claim paying a single dividend δT is:
FT
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17For arbitrary (but von Neuman Morgenstern) utility, Basak (2005) shows that the curvature of the ξ
B with
respect to η is given by a combination of the risk aversions and the prudences of the two groups. One can verify on
his formula that the knife-edge case of zero curvature is the case in which both groups have log utility. A special case
of his result is obtained here for isoelastic utility.
18The “growth conditions” suﬃcient to guarantee that the time integrals in the case of perpetual securities converge
(and that the interchange of the integration and expectation operators in (29) and (30) is allowed) are provided in
Lemma 6. Similar to the way it has been done in Brennan and Xia (2001), one can show that the condition for the
equity price to converge requires that the long-run growth rate of aggregate dividends be less than the long-run risk











χ], which implies that it is independent of the heterogeneity
of agents in the economy.
134 Transform analysis and other technical issues
From Equation (25) for the martingale pricing density under B’s probability measure and Equa-
tions (29) and (30) for the prices of the bond and equity, we see that the joint conditional
distribution of ηu and δu, given δt,ηt, b fB
t ,b gt at t will be needed to characterize the prices of
distant-maturity claims, and hence, portfolio policies. That joint distribution is not easy to









;u ≥ t;ε,χ ∈ R (or C) can be obtained in closed form.
Proposition 1 1. The moment-generating-function for the joint distribution of δ and η at ma-




















































Hg (b g,u,t;ε,χ) = exp
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and where the functions A1, A2, B and C are given in the proof. Moreover, the moment-














and has the sign of ε.
3. For 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1, in a neighborhood of b g = 0, the derivative
∂Hg
∂b g is nonnegative if ε < 0
(εB (χ;u − t) ≥ 0) and nonincreasing (C (χ;u − t) ≤ 0).
Observe, from Equations (32), (33) and (34), that the moment-generating-function for the joint
distribution of δ and η takes the form of a product of a function Hf, which is linear exponential in
b fB, with a function Hg, which is quadratic exponential in b g with all coeﬃcients being functions only
of time and being available in closed form. The formula is a generalization of Heston (1993) and Kim
and Omberg (1996) (recently extended by Liu (2006)) and perhaps others. Our economy’s dynamic
system belongs to the category of exponential aﬃne-quadratic models. Cheng and Scaillet (2006) in
14a term-structure context, have recently clariﬁed the manner in which exponential aﬃne-quadratic
models can be reformulated as exponential aﬃne models,19 for which solutions are well-known.
The inverse transformation to obtain securities prices can be performed in general by means
of the Fast Fourier Transform (see the appendix). For the sake of speed, precision and simplicity,
we conduct the calculation of these prices for the special case in which risk aversion is an integer,
(1 − α) ∈ N, which excludes the cases of risk aversion smaller than 1 (that is, α > 0). While in
general the measure (25) is a weighted power mean of the two terms corresponding to the two
groups, in the special case of risk aversion being an integer, the pricing measure can be written














































. Therefore, using the moment generating func-












b fB,t,u;α − 1
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19That would be done in our context simply by introducing an additional state variable: Z , b g
2.
20Yan (2006) uses a similar approach. Recall that 1 − α > 0. The parameter χ in the function Hg takes values
ranging from 0 to 1.
21To obtain the bond price, the parameter ε in the Hg function is set at α − 1, which is negative unambiguously.
22To obtain the stock price, the parameter ε in the Hg function is set at α, which is negative when risk aversion is
greater than 1.
15Asset prices in our framework are weighted sums of exponential-quadratic functions. The time vary-
ing weights, ω(η), capture the role of the ﬂuctuating distribution of consumption in the population,
itself arising from sentiment ﬂuctuations, η.
5 Excess volatility
In this section, we verify that overconﬁdent beliefs induce higher volatility of asset returns than
would be the case if all investors had proper beliefs. To do so, we study the diﬀusion matrix of
stocks and bonds, which will also be needed when making up portfolios.
The diﬀusion vector of the stock, F, and the bond, P, is its sensitivity or “exposure” to the
shocks in the fundamental and in the signal, dWB
δ and dWB
s , respectively. It can be obtained
from the gradient of the price function postmultiplied by the diﬀusion matrix of state variables
(Equation (7)). Each security’s price exposure, therefore, has four components corresponding to
























































Given the emphasis of this article, however, it will be useful to separate the diﬀusion components
that arise from the movements of the diﬀerence of opinion, b g. We deﬁne the diﬀusion arising from




















































∂b g and ∂P
∂b g capture the exposures to changes in the diﬀerence of opinion. By
deﬁnition, the exposures to Ws shocks arises only from these derivatives. Item 3 of Lemma 1 above













16Table 1: Choice of parameter values and benchmark values of the state variables
This table lists the parameter values used for all the ﬁgures in the paper. These values are similar to
the estimation results reported in Brennan and Xia (2001). The table also indicates the benchmark
values of state variables, which are the reference values taken by all state variables except for the
particular one being varied in a given graph.
Name Symbol Value
Parameters for aggregate endowment and the signal
Long-term average growth rate of aggregate endowment ¯ f 0.015
Volatility of expected growth rate of endowment σf 0.03
Volatility of aggregate endowment σδ 0.13
Mean reversion parameter ζ 0.2
Parameters for the agents
Agent A’s correlation between signal and mean growth rate φ 0.95
Agent B’s correlation between signal and mean growth rate — 0
Agent A’s initial share of aggregate endowment λB/λA 1
Time-preference parameter for both agents ρ 0.10
Relative risk aversion for both agents 1 − α 3
Benchmark values of the state variables
The level of aggregate dividends δ 1
The change from B’s measure to A’s measure η 1
The population average belief about expected rate of growth b fB f
The diﬀerence in opinions: b fB − b fA b g −0.03
when risk aversion is greater than 1, because ε is set at α and at α−1 respectively. It also implies
that these derivatives are nonincreasing in b g.
5.1 Illustration
In order to illustrate the eﬀect of expectations and their dynamics on securities prices, we specify
numerical values for the parameters of the model. Even though our objective is not to match the
magnitude of particular moments in the data, we would like to work with parameter values that
are reasonable.23 The parameter values that we specify are based on the estimation undertaken in
Brennan and Xia (2001) for a model similar to ours.24 We limit ourselves to the case in which risk
aversion is greater than one (α < 0). The particular values chosen for all the parameters are listed
in Table 1.
23The range of parameter values that can be considered is restricted by the need to satisfy the growth conditions in
Lemma 6, so that the prices of perpetual assets (equity and consol bond) are well deﬁned. This limits, in particular,
the range of values for the discount rate, or for risk aversion, that can be considered. Because of this constraint,
the risk aversion we consider is somewhat too low to account for the equity premium by itself. The presence of
overconﬁdent traders, however, suﬃces to bring the equity premium up to realistic levels.
24We have not set the volatility of the signal, σs, at any particular number because that is immaterial and what
matters is only the level of the correlation with the expected rate of growth of the fundamental.
17As we analyze securities’ returns and portfolio strategies, we display results for the following
four cases:
Case 1. Where all agents have the proper beliefs (φ = 0) and are in agreement about the growth
rate of aggregate dividends (b g = 0, or zero diﬀerence of opinion). This corresponds to the
setting in a standard model where all agents have homogeneous beliefs and identical priors.
Case 2. Where all agents have the proper beliefs (φ = 0) but disagree about the growth rate
(b g 6= 0). This corresponds to the setting where agents have the same beliefs but diﬀerent
priors.
Case 3. Where one group of agents is overconﬁdent (φ = 0.95)25 but currently in agreement with
the other group about the growth rate (b g = 0). Because Group A is overconﬁdent in the
signal, even though they currently agree with Group B, they will disagree in the future.
Case 4. Where one group of agents is overconﬁdent (φ = 0.95) and disagrees today about the
growth rate (b g 6= 0). In this case, agents of the two groups have diﬀerent beliefs and these
beliefs ﬂuctuate randomly over time.
Our results are displayed in ﬁgures. Each plot in the ﬁgures has on the x-axis either current dif-
ference of opinion, b g, or the relative share of aggregate consumption of the overconﬁdent Groups A,
ω. Each plot has typically three curves on it, with the dotted line representing the case where all
agents have the proper beliefs (φ = 0), the dashed line representing the case where Group A is
overconﬁdent (φ = 0.95) and the continuous line representing the construct “diﬀ3” containing three
terms only, agents A being, however, overconﬁdent.
Note that when φ = 0, everyone has proper beliefs and so they ignore the signal. This implies
that eﬀectively there is only one shock in the economy Consequently, one risky security is suﬃcient
to complete the ﬁnancial market; that is, the equity and the bond are redundant relative to each
other.
Figure 1 portrays the relative diﬀusion vectors for stocks and bonds with respect to the Wδ
shock. We draw three inferences from this ﬁgure. First, we see that the dotted curves for the case
of proper beliefs and the solid line for the case of overconﬁdent beliefs but ignoring the derivative















25When we vary the parameter φ, we adjust the ratio
λBη
λA in such a way that the time-0 lifetime budget constraints
of the two groups still hold, with unchanged time-0 endowments of securities.
18Figure 1: Diﬀusion of equity and bond
The ﬁgure has four plots. The top two show the diﬀusion of equity and bond rates of return
with respect to the output shock as functions of the current diﬀerence of opinion, b g, for a value of
sentiment such that ω = 0.5. The bottom two plots show the same as functions of ω for a value of the
diﬀerence of opinion b g = −0.03. Each plot in the ﬁgure has three curves on it, with the dotted line
representing the case where all agents have the proper beliefs (φ = 0), the dashed line representing
the case where Group A is overconﬁdent (φ = 0.95) and the solid line representing the construct
“diﬀ3” containing three terms only, Group A being, however, overconﬁdent. All other parameter
values used in this ﬁgure are given in Table 1.
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for the bond hardly change with φ and that the diﬀerence arises mostly from







comparing the dashed line for the case of overconﬁdence to the other two in any plot, we conclude
that the changes in the diﬀusion vector of assets arising from overconﬁdence are almost entirely the
result of the b g component. To understand the eﬀect of b g, recall from Lemma 1, that the intercept
and slope of the two partial derivatives ∂F
∂b g and ∂P
∂b g have respectively the signs of the εB (≥ 0) and
C (≤ 0) terms of the moment generating function. Furthermore, as we have indicated earlier in
Lemma 2, overconﬁdence has a marked eﬀect on the diﬀusion of the diﬀerence of opinion b g, with
the signs indicated in Equation (7). Because (γB − γA)/σδ ≥ 0, the traders know that a positive
26Prior to integrating the present values of payoﬀs over future times, these logarithmic derivatives would be exactly
independent of φ. The value of φ aﬀects only the relative weighting of the future payoﬀs.
19dWB
δ shock will increase the diﬀerence of opinion (see also Equation (4)) and because −φσf ≤ 0,
a positive dWB
s shock will decrease it.
Thirdly, we see from Figure 1 that equity is mostly positively exposed to the realized innovation
in the fundamental, dWB
δ , whereas the bond is negatively exposed. The reason for this diﬀerence
between the equity and the bond is that a positive shock to the fundamental aﬀects equity in
two ways: it changes the immediate payoﬀ upward but also the valuation operator downward; the
positive eﬀect dominates, at least in a neighborhood of b g = 0.27 For bonds, an innovation in the
fundamental has only a valuation eﬀect, which is negative (diﬀP < 0). The signal innovation,
dWB
s , is similar in its eﬀects but it has no immediate payoﬀ implication, so that both the equity
and the bond have a negative exposure to it, which, however, is not displayed in the ﬁgure.
5.2 Volatilities and correlation
The volatilities of assets are obtained from the diﬀusion vectors described in the previous subsection.
The eﬀect of the overconﬁdence of Group A is generally to increase the volatility of asset prices.
This occurs because of the greatly increased volatility of the state variable b g representing the
diﬀerence of opinion, which also increases the volatility of sentiment, η.
Figure 2 plots the volatilities of the rate of return on equity and the bond, and the correlation
between them. In the ﬁrst column of the ﬁgure, these three quantities are plotted against diﬀerence
of opinion, b g, for the two cases of overconﬁdent beliefs (φ = 0.95, dashed line) and proper beliefs
(φ = 0, dotted line). In the second column of the ﬁgure, these three quantities are plotted for the
same two cases but now against the relative weight of Group A, ω.
From the ﬁrst two plots in the left column of Figure 2, we see that overconﬁdent investors
create “noise” that increases the volatility of both risky assets—the stock and the bond. 28 The
last row of the plots in Figure 2 shows that the correlation between stock and bond returns increases
or decreases with the presence of overconﬁdent investors, as well as with the diﬀerence of opinion
between the two investor groups, depending on whether it is equal to plus or minus 1 in the absence
of overconﬁdence. In a neighborhood of b g = 0, when risk aversion is greater than 1, it increases
as the prices of the equity and the bond move in the same direction when expectations of future
growth ﬂuctuate.
27This is in part the result of the unambiguous negative eﬀect of an increase in b f
B on the price of equity for the
case where α < 0. However, a fundamental shock dW
B
δ has an eﬀect also on the other state variables.
28The values produced by the model for the volatility of bond returns (and interest rates) are regrettably too high
to ﬁt real-world data. With a risk aversion smaller than 1, David (2007) was able to match the volatility of interest
rates much better. Alternatively, if one wanted to match interest-rate volatility, one could introduce habit formation.
20Figure 2: Volatilities of equity and bond returns and their correlation
The ﬁrst column of this ﬁgure plots against dispersion in beliefs, b g, the volatilities of equity and
bond returns and their correlation, assuming that the two groups of investors have equal weight,
ω = 0.5. In the second column of this ﬁgure, the same quantities are plotted but now against the
relative weight of Group A in the population, ω, assuming that b g = −0.03. There are two curves
in each plot: the dotted curve is for the case of proper beliefs (φ = 0) and the dashed curve is for
overconﬁdent beliefs (φ = 0.95). All other parameter values used in this ﬁgure are given in Table 1.
























































An exception to the increase in volatility arising from overconﬁdence is to be seen in the right-
hand column, middle row. When the consumption share of overconﬁdent investors, ω, is suﬃciently
low, it is possible for the volatility of bonds to be reduced by overconﬁdence, because of the opposite
eﬀects of η and b g on the volatility of the bond price.
In summary, overconﬁdent investors create “noise”, which tends to increase the volatility of
both stock and bond returns and also the correlation between them. The volatilities and correlation
mostly increase with an increase in the relative weight of Group A in the population. We are going
to see now that overconﬁdent investors also chase away from the bond and equity markets the
investors with proper beliefs.
216 Equity-and-bond portfolio strategy of Group B analyzed ac-
cording to motive
We now study the ﬂuctuations of the wealth of Group B and deduce from it the main features of
the portfolio strategy of the investors with the proper beliefs.
The wealth of agents of Group B can be determined by applying the same approach that we
used to ﬁnd the equity and bond prices (see the appendix). To do so, we interpret the wealth of
agents of Group B as the price of a “security” whose ﬂow payoﬀ at future times u is the consumption
(27) of these investors:29
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Following Cox and Huang (1989), the portfolio choice of Group B in terms of equities and bonds






shocks, which are themselves
obtained by multiplying the gradient vector of B’s wealth with respect to the four state variables by
the diﬀusion matrix of the four state variables given in Equation (7). If the investors had available
elementary securities on the shocks, the exposures would indicate the desired amounts of holdings.
If, however, they have access to an equity share and a bond, the investor needs to use these to


























































29Again, Formula (43) applies only when risk aversion is an integer greater than zero, therefore, at least equal to
1. Hence it applies only for α < 0. The parameter ε of the characteristic function is set at α and the parameter χ
takes values ranging from 0 to −
α
1−α > 0. The latter is a positive rational number smaller than 1.
22Figure 3: Diﬀusion of wealth
The ﬁgure has two plots. The one on the left shows the diﬀusion of the wealth of Group B with
respect to output shocks as a function of the current diﬀerence of opinion, b g, for a value of sentiment
such that ω = 0.5. The right-hand plot shows the same as a function of ω, for a value of the
diﬀerence of opinion b g = −0.03. Each plot in the ﬁgure has three curves on it, with the dotted line
representing the case where all agents have the proper beliefs (φ = 0), the dashed line representing
the case where Group A is overconﬁdent (φ = 0.95), and the continuous line representing the
construct “diﬀ3” containing three terms only, Group A being, however, overconﬁdent. All other
parameter values used in this ﬁgure are given in Table 1.
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Expos of B wealth to W∆
where the left hand-side contains the investor’s target exposures and the right-hand side the expo-
sures of the available securities, which we have analyzed in Section 5. We now study the terms of































In Figure 3, the components of the exposure strategy as fractions of B’s wealth are drawn
against the current diﬀerence of opinion, b g, and against the current weight of the overconﬁdent
group A, ω, the exact same format being used as in Figure 1 for the exposures of equity and the
bond.
Three conclusions emerge from the comparison of the three curves in both plots of Figure 3.













23Second, the dashed line is vastly diﬀerent from the other two. As was the case for equity and
for the same reasons, the only components of exposure demands that are markedly aﬀected by the
presence of overconﬁdence are the b g components. As has been well explained by Merton (1973),
a state variable has an impact on Group B’s wealth for two possible economic reasons: (i) it can
change the prospect for the immediate return on a given portfolio held by Group B, and (ii) it
can aﬀect the investment opportunities in the future that Group B will face when rebalancing
their portfolio. The eﬀects of Type (ii) can be explained by means of the concept of “favorable
or unfavorable shift in the investment opportunity set” introduced by Merton (1973), where “a
favorable shift” is deﬁned as a change in a state variable such that, for given immediately anticipated
returns, consumption rises for a given level of wealth.30 Lemma 1 implies that, in a neighborhood
of b g = 0, when risk aversion is greater than 1, the derivative ∂FB
∂b g is nonnegative: an increase in the
diﬀerence of opinion is an unfavorable shift for Group B (as it is for everyone). Because
γB−γA
σδ ≥ 0,
the traders with the proper beliefs know that a positive dWB
δ shock will increase the diﬀerence of
opinion (see also Equation (4)). To oﬀset this, they construct their portfolio to have a positive
exposure to dWB
δ .31
Finally, a comparison of the gap between the dotted and the dashed curves in Figure 3 and
in the equity plot of Figure 1 reveals that this gap is smaller in Figure 3. This is the eﬀect of a
general result, which is strongly supported by the numerical experiments we have conducted: To
each maturity T, Group B desires to have an exposure to diﬀerence-of-opinion risk per unit of


















We discuss the cases φ = 0 and φ 6= 0 separately because, as mentioned above, if everyone has
proper beliefs (φ = 0) then of the two risky securities one is redundant. That is, the portfolio
30For instance, because ε, in the calculation of F





















∂ b fB < 0.
An increase in their estimate of growth is a favorable shift for Group B (as it is for everyone): their wealth decreases,
their consumption increases.
31Because −φσf ≤ 0, the opposite is true for the signal shock.

























































so that the portfolio is indeterminate. In this case, one of the optimal portfolio choices is where












A more “natural”portfolio choice may be for B to hold equity in proportion to its wealth and
to use the bond to take a position on sentiment risk, η, and the risk of growth of the economy, b fB,
which are perfectly correlated with each other in this case. In this way, they would use equity to































That last portfolio composition is represented in Figure 4 by the dotted lines. When there is zero
diﬀerence of opinion (and φ = 0), then both agents are identical, and therefore, they hold the same










Turning now to the case φ 6= 0, a few algebraic manipulations indicate that the system of




































































Our principal result follows from this equation:
32When deriving (51) from (49), we used the results in Footnote 30.
33A third possibility would be the limit as φ → 0 of the portfolio applicable when φ 6= 0 (see below Equation (54)).
That limit would just be equal to the value of (54) calculated at φ = 0.
25Figure 4: Portfolio choice
The ﬁgure has four plots. The top two show Group B’s demand for equity and bond as a fraction of
their wealth against the current diﬀerence of opinion b g for a value of sentiment such that ω = 0.5. The
bottom two plots show the same against ω for a value of the diﬀerence of opinion b g = −0.03. Each
plot in the ﬁgure has three curves on it, with the dotted line representing the case where all agents
have the proper beliefs (φ = 0), the dashed line representing the case where Group A is overconﬁdent
(with φ = 0.95) and the solid line representing the limit of the latter when φrightarrow0. All other
parameter values used in this ﬁgure are given in Table 1.
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B demand for bond
Proposition 2 For as long as φ 6= 0, the portfolio choice is independent of the speciﬁc value of φ












































where θF is the number of units of equity demanded and θP the number of units of the bond.
Figure 4 contains a lot of information about the solution (54). The dashed lines represent







φ = 0.95. The solid line represents the limit of (54) when φ → 0. Quite obviously these two lines in
all four plots are very close to each other. So, even though the proposition rigorously says that the
26portfolio demand does not depend on the speciﬁc value of φ “except through the value functions F,
P and FB,” we can practically ignore the caveat when examining the fractional composition of the
portfolio. The demand for securities depends negligibly on the degree of overconﬁdence (although
equilibrium prices and consumption allocations do depend on it), for as long as it is not equal
to zero. The only thing that matters for B’s portfolio demand is whether there exist people in
the market who are somewhat overconﬁdent. This conclusion is obviously in line with our earlier
remarks about Equations (42) and (47). The modicum of variation in portfolio demand in relation
to the value of φ is mostly due to the sensitivity 1
FB
∂FB
∂η to sentiment risk. In the bottom plots
of Figure 4, the demands are drawn against the consumption share ω of overconﬁdent investors in
the population. Evidently, even a limitingly small presence of overconﬁdent investors in the market
causes Group B to follow the portfolio strategy that takes overconﬁdence into account.





























































































































Because, for given maturity T, 1
FB,T
∂FB,T
∂ b fB = 1
FT
∂FT




















(Lemma 1 and Equation (48)), it follows that similar equalities
and inequalities hold also but approximately for the integrated prices and thus we have the following
result: When b g = 0, Group B holds fewer units of equity and bonds than the number corresponding
to their share of wealth:
θF <
FB
FT and θP < 0. (56)
The reason Group B holds fewer units of equity and bonds than the number corresponding
to their share of wealth is that their share of wealth invested in equity and bonds would contain
too much diﬀerence-of-opinion risk. Risk averse investors with the proper beliefs of Group B are
deterred by the presence of the overconﬁdent traders, whose diﬀerence of opinion is a source of risk
in their eyes. Hence, investors with the proper beliefs prefer to take refuge in the riskless short-term
asset, unless they are very optimistic about future growth. Thus, the short-term deposit is the only
safe haven from sentiment risk. These results imply that the presence of overconﬁdent investors
not only distorts the stock and bond markets, but also scares away rational investors. In the words
of De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a), “noise traders create their own space.”
27That property is, of course, illustrated in Figure 4 (top left plot) as are a number of additional
features of Group B’s demand. The demand schedule for equity is upward sloping as a function
of b g. The reason for this is that even though Group B are driven away by the presence of the
overconﬁdent traders, they overcome their fear when they are very optimistic about future growth.
7 On long-run predictability
There exists a logical link between the phenomenon of excessive volatility and the long-run pre-
dictability of stock returns. Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b) and Cochrane (2001, page 394 ﬀ ),
have pointed out that the dividend-price ratio would be constant over time if dividends were un-
predictable (speciﬁcally, if they followed a geometric Brownian walk) and expected returns were
constant. Because the dividend-price ratio is changing, its changes must be predicting either future
changes in dividends or future changes in expected returns. This statement is true in any economic
model, unless there are violations of the transversality conditions. Empirically, the dividend-price
ratio hardly predicts subsequent dividends. It must, therefore, predict returns. But, if it predicts
returns, it can serve as valuable information for a rational person trading in the market. We now
show how that aspect is embedded in our model and in the equilibrium portfolio strategy that
we have just described.34 As we saw, that strategy was crucially driven by the derivatives of the
price functions with respect to the diﬀerence of opinion: ∂FB
∂b g , ∂F
∂b g , and ∂P
∂b g . In essence, we want to
produce an interpretation of these derivatives in terms of anticipated returns.
In performing that task, it will be convenient to use Malliavin derivatives. Just as the standard
derivative measures the local change of a function to a small change in an underlying variable, the
Malliavin derivative measures the change in a path-dependent function implied by a small change
in the initial value of the underlying Brownian motions. In the context of our model, Malliavin
calculus allows for a very clean and insightful interpretation of the results, and in particular, allows
us to distinguish between instantaneous eﬀects and long-term eﬀects.35
Denoting by DB
δ,tXu the response at time u of a process X to a unit dWB
δ shock having occurred
at time t with u ≥ t, and by DB
t Xu = {DB
δ,tXu,DB
s,tXu} the row vector of responses to the two
shocks, {dWB
δ,t,dWB
s,t}, we compute below the Malliavin derivatives of the four state variables.
Observe that DB
t Xt is another notation for the diﬀusion vector of the process X at time t.
34For recent work studying long run risk and return, see Alvarez and Jermann (2005) and Hansen and Scheinkman
(2005).
35An introduction to Malliavin calculus with applications to problems in ﬁnance can be found in Detemple and
Zapatero (1991, Appendix A) and Detemple, Garcia, and Rindisbacher (2003, Appendix D). For additional details
on Malliavin calculus, see Ocone and Karatzas (1991), Nualart (1995), and Øksendal (1997).



























































Observe from Equations (57) and (58) that the responses in b fB
u and b gu follow deterministic
paths. From Equations (59) and (60) we see that the perturbations in the fundamental δ and the
sentiment η accumulate the perturbations in b fB and b g; shocks occurring today have a declining
eﬀect on future values of the fundamental and the sentiment.36 Given Equations (30), (25) and
(35), one can, for instance, calculate the Malliavin derivatives of the discounted price FT of a single
dividend to be paid at time T > t:37
DB



































































t FT is the diﬀusion vector of equity, there is a direct association between the four























































σδ , because the current shocks have an impact on the diﬀusion b gu that is applied to future
shocks to get the diﬀusion of ηu.
37Here we follow closely Detemple, Garcia, and Rindisbacher (2003).
29Equation (65) in particular, and similar ones written for the bond and the wealth of B, provide
us with the promised interpretation of the derivative ∂F
∂b g with respect to the diﬀerence of opinion:
it captures the covariation over the entire investment horizon between future output and future
changes in the diﬀerence of opinion weighted by the future weight of the overconﬁdent population.
We have thus identiﬁed the relevant statistics that the asset manager of Group B needs to have in
mind over the entire future. The explicit solutions for F, P and FB that we have exhibited allow
one to forecast the terms in the curly brackets on the right-hand side of (65).
We would like to show now how sentiment risk contributes to anticipated returns in general,
irrespective of the speciﬁc menu of securities available in the market.
7.1 Instantaneous pricing of risk
By construction (see Cox and Huang (1989)), the instantaneous market price of risk (or Sharpe
ratio) is equal to minus the diﬀusion of the pricing measure. It is the instantaneous response of
the stochastic discount factor to shocks occurring today. Knowing the pricing measure (25), Itˆ o’s
lemma gives directly the following result (which we state without proof):






















(1 − α)σδ 0
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From Equation (67), we see that the prices of risk κB contain an instantaneous premium for the
output shock Wδ but no instantaneous premium for the signal shock Ws. If there is no diﬀerence
of opinion (b g = 0), the prices of risk κB include only the traditional reward for fundamental risk
(1 − α)σδ. As soon as there is a diﬀerence of opinion, investors realize that “sentiment” will
ﬂuctuate randomly in response to output shocks. Hence, they start charging a premium also for
the risk arising from the vagaries of others. The premium is proportional to the product of the
diﬀerence of opinion b g with the relative weight ω of the overconﬁdent population.
It is noteworthy that, once the current values of the state variables η, b fB,b g (describing the
current population and its expectations) are given, the instantaneous return and risk reward on
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30immediate-maturity instruments do not depend on the degree of overconﬁdence, φ, of Group A.
The overconﬁdence coeﬃcient, φ, aﬀects only the future dynamics of the state variables. For that
reason, it has an impact on returns but only for assets maturing beyond the immediate date, a
topic to which we turn now.
7.2 Long-run pricing of risk
The multiperiod rate of return of an asset that delivers a unit payoﬀ at time T in a given state and
that was bought at time t (t < T) in a given state is ξt/ξT. However, that would be the relevant
long-run return if one were to buy that asset at t and hold it until T. If there exists a ﬁnancial
market that allows repricing and retrading tomorrow of assets bought today, we show now that this
is the not the concept of long-run return that is relevant for portfolio choice. As will be apparent
in Equation (71) below, the long-run excess return that is relevant is the long-run response DB
t ξB
T















Notice again the crucial role of the relative weight of the overconﬁdent group in the perturbation
of the pricing kernel.
The long-run return has two components: the ﬁrst arising from the ﬂuctuations in output and




would not be present in a market without overconﬁdent investors (ω = 0), is a predictable com-
ponent and it modiﬁes the long-run behavior of returns. Long-run returns are very much aﬀected
by the current values of state variables, a situation commonly referred to in the Finance literature
as “return predictability”. In this model, however, return predictability is not as simple as has
been commonly envisaged in the empirical Finance literature. For instance, there exists sometimes
a positive relation between expected return on equity and the dividend yield and sometimes a
negative one. This matter is analyzed by Berrada (2006).
Using (60) to expand
DB
t ηT













































31Thus, the long-run price of risk is equal to the short-run price of risk, plus the impact DB
t b fB
u of
future changes in beliefs of Group B, plus the short-run impact of the sentiment weighted by the
future change in the weight of the overconﬁdent population, and the impact DB
t b gu of future changes
in the diﬀerence of opinion. Because future consumption is a function of the state price for the
future maturity, these four components drive Group B’s portfolio strategy.
7.3 Portfolio strategy in terms of short-run and long-run returns
Let FB,T denote the price at date t today of a single-maturity unit of consumption to be consumed



























The Malliavin derivatives of the price can be written:
DB



































































Proposition 3 Group B’s portfolio reﬂects two motivations:
1. The ﬁrst term of the equation is a myopic portfolio seeking to reap immediate excess return
per unit of risk ,
2. The second term is an intertemporal hedge which incorporates the prospect of longer-run
returns. For each future consumption date T, the second term can be further split into:
(a) A hedge against future shocks to b fB






















(b) A myopic exposure to the immediate movement in the sentiment η, which is also a hedge



















32(c) A hedge against the product of A’s future consumption share ω (ηT) with the future shocks
































As Equations (69) and (71) reveal, the more “strategic” exploitation of the long-run predictabil-
ity created by overconﬁdent investors is imbedded in the intertemporal hedge. Group B knows that
its share of consumption will ﬂuctuate, that it will revise its expectations of growth, that the other
group also will and that it will do so in a manner diﬀerent from theirs. So, these are the three
considerations that are incorporated in when they choose the hedging component of their portfolio.
In contrast to the intertemporal hedging portfolio in Merton (1971), which is expressed in terms
of the partial derivatives of the investor’s value function, the three expressions given in Item 2
of Proposition 3 show explicitly how Group B’s expectations of future growth, sentiment, and
diﬀerence of opinion inﬂuence the hedging component of the portfolio.
8 Epilogue: Survival
We now return to the question we asked originally concerning the potential for gains that the
excessive volatility creates for the investors with the proper beliefs who follow the portfolio strategy
that we described in the previous section. By asking whether rational risk arbitrageurs can take
advantage of overconﬁdent investors, we simultaneously ask whether investors with the proper
beliefs eliminate overconﬁdent investors from the economy very quickly, or whether overconﬁdent
investors can survive for some time. The main goal of this exercise is to demonstrate that the
phenomena we have analyzed in this article do not go away quickly, contra Alchian (1950) and
Friedman (1953).
The survival of irrational traders is an issue that was raised by De Long, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldmann (1990a, 1991) in a partial-equilibrium setting, in which traders did not aﬀect prices.
The survival of excessively optimistic or pessimistic agents, in an economy in which one category of
agents knows the true probability distribution, is the focus of recent papers by Kogan, Ross, Wang,
and Westerﬁeld (2006) and Yan (2006). Here, however, we consider a diﬀerent kind of overconﬁdent
agents, who change their mind too frequently, being sometimes too optimistic and at other times
too pessimistic about the growth rate of aggregate dividends, as compared to investors with the
proper beliefs, not as compared to the truth. Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerﬁeld (2006) considers
agents who consume only at some terminal horizon date so that their saving rate is not optimized
and the growth of the economy is not an important factor in the analysis. Yan (2006), in contrast,
33Figure 5: Survival of the overconﬁdent Group A
The plot on the left gives the probability density function (pdf) of Group A’s share of consumption,
ωu, after the passage of u years. The plot on the right shows the expected value under the objective
measure of Group A’s consumption share, EP
0 ωu, as a function of time measured in years, with
current time assumed to be 0 and future time denoted by u on the x-axis. In the second plot, the
dotted line represents the case where φ = 0 and all agents have the correct beliefs, while the solid
line represents the case where φ = 0.50 and the dashed line represents the case where φ = 0.95
implying that Group A is overconﬁdent. The parameter values used here are given in Table 1. In
particular, the two groups of investors have equal initial weights, ω0 = 1/2.




















considers agents who consume intertemporally and make optimal savings decisions. In an economy
with a speciﬁcation that is very close to ours, Berrada (2004) has discussed the issue of survival by
means of simulations.
Most previous studies, with the exception of Berrada (2004), have deﬁned “survival” in terms
of the “irrational” agents’ asymptotic share of wealth as the horizon goes to inﬁnity. In general,
however, wealth is a suﬃcient summary statistic neither of an agent’s welfare nor of his or her
inﬂuence on asset prices. Under von Neuman-Morgenstern, time-additive utility, the share of
consumption is such a summary statistic. Therefore, we measure the survival of overconﬁdent
agents in the economy by studying the evolution of the share of the total dividend that will be
consumed by them. The probability distribution of this share is computed under the objective, or
true, probability measure rather than under the measure of either Group A or B.
Group A’s ratio of consumption to aggregate dividends is given by Equation (28). To compute
the distribution of this ratio under the true or eﬀective probability measure, we need the conditional
distribution of ηu, given ηt,ft, b fA
t , andb fB
t at t. As in Section 4, we ﬁrst obtain its characteristic
function (see Lemma 5 in the appendix). Then, the expected value and the probability distribution
of the share of Group A’s consumption in (28) can be obtained by means of Fourier inversion (as
shown in Equation (A61) of the appendix).
We study the case where Groups A and B start out with the same estimate of the future growth
rate, that is, b fA = b fB and also consume the same share of aggregate dividend, ω0 = 1/2. Recall
also that we are assuming that both categories of agents have the same, time additive, isoelastic
34utility function. In the left plot of Figure 5, we plot the probability density function of Group A’s
share of consumption after the passage of diﬀerent numbers of years. We see from the left plot
that as time passes, the density moves to the left, and thus, Group A’s share of consumption is
decreasing. To understand the rate at which this share is decreasing, in the right plot we plot the
expected value of this share, EP
0 [ωu], against time measured in years. This plot in the right plot
considers three cases: one, where Group A has the proper beliefs (φ = 0), the second where Group A
is overconﬁdent with φ = 0.50, and the third where it is even more conﬁdent with φ = 0.95.
Both plots conﬁrm that ultimately, overconﬁdent agents become extinct in that their share of
consumption vanishes. This is simply the result of the fact that ω is a monotonic function (28) of
a positive martingale η. As is the case for any positive martingale, the probability mass (or the























so that this long-run decrease takes place at the rate b g2. But, the more interesting observation is
that, in contrast to what is typically assumed in models of rational asset pricing, overconﬁdent
agents do not lose out right away. For instance, the right-hand side plot in Figure 5 shows that
after 100 years the overconﬁdent agents’ expected share of consumption of the aggregate dividends
is still at 20% compared to the initial share of 50%. Recall that in Figure 2 we showed that the
relation between the volatility of equity returns and the consumption share of Group A is close to
being linear. The fact that the overconﬁdent group is not eliminated from the population instantly
implies that the phenomenon of excess volatility will also not be eliminated quickly.
9 Conclusion
In a capital market characterized by excessive volatility, we have analyzed the return behavior that
would prevail in equilibrium and the trading strategy that would allow a rational investor with the
proper beliefs to take advantage of the excess volatility generated by the presence of overconﬁdent
investors. To achieve our goal, we have constructed a general-equilibrium “diﬀerence-of-opinion”
model in which stock prices are excessively volatile, using the device proposed by Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003). In our model, there are two groups of agents, and one group (overconﬁdent) believes
that the magnitude of the correlation between the innovations in the signal and innovations in
some unobserved variable (the expected growth rate of dividends) is larger than it actually is.
Consequently, when a signal is received, this group of agents adjusts their beliefs too much and
35overreacts to it, which then generates excessive stock price movements. The excess movement was
regarded as a “sentiment” factor.
For given beliefs, however, both classes of agents are rational in their decision making, in the
sense that both are intertemporal optimizers. In this way, the overconﬁdent investors are not sitting
ducks. We show that investors with the proper beliefs have to engage in a fairly intricate investment
strategy to triumph over the overconﬁdent ones. And their victory can be achieved only in the
fairly long run.
We believe that our undertaking brings two beneﬁts. First, given that we have worked out in
careful detail the optimal portfolio strategies to be followed by rational investors with the proper
beliefs, our model should be of practical use to hedge funds who play the price-convergence game
and in so doing expose themselves to “market sentiment” risk. They often have at their disposal
perfect-market pricing models that allow them to spot pricing anomalies. But, that is not suﬃcient
information to put into place a “risk arbitrage” strategy, including the optimal timing of trades
into the strategy, of trades out of the strategy, plus the accompanying hedges. For that purpose,
hedge funds also need a model of the equilibrium stochastic process which describes how sentiment
will drive price spreads. We provide one such model.
Second, the model parsimoniously combines the technical virtues of continuous-time, rational-
expectations equilibrium asset pricing models (including the use of the martingale approach) with
a single, well-deﬁned, almost axiomatic deviation from the case where all agents have the proper
beliefs. In this way, it has allowed us to analyze the equilibrium consequences of that speciﬁc
deviation. We hope that this model, or similar models obtained by this method, can become
workhorses in the development of behavioral equilibrium theory.
36Appendix: Proofs for lemmas
Proof for Lemma 2: Volatilities of the state variables
Substituting Equations (1) and (14) into (12) and (13) gives the expressions in Equations (15),
(16), and (17). The sign for each expression can then be established using the expressions for γA
and γB in Footnote 11 and by showing that γA is decreasing in φ, while γB is equal to γA evaluated
at φ = 0.
Proof for Proposition 1: The moment-generating function
To prove this lemma, we need to determine:
H

δ,η, b fB,b g,t,u;ε,χ

= EB
δ,η,b fB,b g [(δu)
ε (ηu)
χ]. (A1)
This function satisﬁes the linear PDE:
0 ≡ LH







δ,η, b fB,b g,t,u;ε,χ

, (A2)
with the initial condition H

δ,η, b fB,b g,t,t;ε,χ







under the probability measure of Group B.

































































































The solution of this PDE is
H

δ,η, b fB,b g,t,u;ε,χ





× Hg (b g,t,u;ε,χ), (A4)
where Hf(b fB,t,u;ε) and Hg(b g,t,u;ε,χ) are deﬁned in (33) and (34).39 Substituting (A4) into the
PDE and simplifying, we ﬁnd that the functions of time, A1,A2,B and C, that are present in (34)
39To see that Hf, which is deﬁned in (33), is the moment generating function for δu/δ under Group B’s measure,
one can verify that δ
εHf(b f
B,t;u,ε) solves the PDE in (A4) but with all terms that are the partial derivatives of H
with respect to either η or b g dropped.
37need to solve the following ODEs:
C0 (u − t) = aC2 (u − t) − 2bC (u − t) + c, C (0) = 0, (A5)





C(u − t), B (0) = 0, (A6)
A0
1 (u − t) =
a
2
C (u − t), A1 (0) = 0, (A7)
A0
2 (u − t) = B (u − t)
h
m + ne−ζ(u−t) +
a
4
B (u − t)
i


































































Of the ODEs (A5)–(A8), all are ﬁrst-degree linear with constant coeﬃcients, except (A5),
which is a Riccati (i.e., quadratic) equation. Radon’s lemma says that one solution is of the form:
C (u − t) = y (u − t)/x(u − t), where y and x satisfy a system of two linear ODEs with constant
coeﬃcients. We can, therefore, obtain the solution. Denoting
q =
p
b2 − ac, (A16)
and
υ1 = 0, ϑ1 =
2cm + k(b + q)
q
, (A17)
υ2 = 2q, ϑ2 =
2cm + k(b − q)
q
, (A18)
υ3 = ζ, ϑ3 =
2cn + l(b + q)
q − ζ
, (A19)
υ4 = 2q + ζ, ϑ4 =
2cn + l(b − q)
q + ζ
, (A20)
υ5 = q, ϑ5 = −(ϑ1 + ϑ2 + ϑ3 + ϑ4), (A21)
38we obtain




q + b + (q − b)e−2q(u−t), (A22)
B (u − t) =
P5
i=1 ϑie−υi(u−t)
q + b + (q − b)e−2q(u−t), (A23)










(b − q)(u − t) + ln(2q) − ln

q + b + (q − b)e−2q(u−t)
i
,
A2 (u − t) =
Z u
t
B (τ − t)
h
m + ne−ζ(τ−t) +
a
4











ϑiϑjD2 (υi + υj;u − t)
where, denoting by H the standard hypergeometric function,


































, p > 0,
and





q + b + (q − b)e−2q(u−t)2dτ
=
1






q + b + (q − b)e−2q(u−t) + (2q − p)D1 (p;u − t)
#
. (A27)
To show that the function Hg (b g,t,u;ε,χ) is well deﬁned for χ ∈ [0,1] and u ≥ t, ﬁrst note that
the radicand in the expression (A16) for q may be written as a quadratic trinomial of χ:














q0 = ζ2 +
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Because φ ∈ [0,1] and ζ > 0, it is immediate that q2 ≤ 0, q0 > ζ2, and






39So, when χ ∈ [0,1], q =
√
b2 − ac is real. Moreover, q > ζ so that {ϑi}
5
i=1 are ﬁnite.

















we obtain that q − b ≥ 0 and
q + b + (q − b)e−2q(u−t) ≥ q + b > 0. (A34)
Therefore, when χ ∈ [0,1] and u ≥ t, the functions C (u − t) and B (u − t) are well deﬁned and
bounded; the integrals A1 (u − t) and A2 (u − t) are convergent, and thus, their closed-form expres-
sions (A25) and (A8) are also well deﬁned.





(b g,t,u;ε,χ) = εB (χ;u − t) + 2b gC (χ;u − t). (A35)
Because ηu is a martingale under the measure of Group B, for 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1, it must be the case by













= Hg (b g,t,u;0,χ) = exp

A1 (χ;u − t) + b g2C (χ;u − t)
	
, (A36)
this implies C (χ;u − t) ≤ 0.
We prove that B (χ;u − t) is non-positive by contradiction. Assume the function B (u − t)
takes positive values. Then because this function is smooth and B (0) = 0, there must exist u1 ≥ t
such that B (u1 − t) = 0 and B0 (u1 − t) > 0. However, it can be shown that the RHS in (A6) is
nonpositive at u1. Actually, because B (u1 − t) = 0 the ﬁrst term in (A6) is equal to zero. Then
from (A12) and (A13), k,k + l ≤ 0 and hence k + le−ζ(u1−t) ≤ 0. Finally, m + ne−ζ(u1−t) ≥ 0
because from (A14) and (A15)





where the last identity can be veriﬁed by substituting the expressions for γA and γB into (A9) and
(A14). Therefore, by contradiction, we have shown that B (u − t) ≤ 0.
Proof for Lemma 3: Malliavin derivatives of state variables
The solution of Equation (2) being:
b fB
u = b fB
t +
























40Similarly, the solution of Equation (4) being:








t b gu = e−ψ(u−t) 
σb gδ σb gs

. (A40)
Because the solution of Equation (1) is:


































































































































































σb gδ σb gs

.
Proof for Lemma 5: Moment-generating function of η under the eﬀective measure



















AP (χ;u − t) + CA (χ;u − t)
 
b gA2
+ CB (χ;u − t)
 
b gB2
+ 2b gAb gBCAB (χ;u − t)
o
, (A45)
for certain functions of time AP,CA,CB, and CAB that are given in the proof.






η,b gA,b gB [ηu]
χ . (A46)
Under the objective probability measure, the processes η, b gA and b gB obey the following stochastic
diﬀerential equations:
db gA


























































satisﬁes the linear PDE:
















































































































































is deﬁned in (A45) and




































, itself deﬁned as follows. Let matrices X (u − t) and Y (u − t) be the unique
solution of the linear Cauchy problem
( .
X = Q11X + Q12Y, X (0) = I,
.
Y = Q21X + Q22Y, Y (0) = 0,
(A54)
42where I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix. Then Z (u − t) = Y (u − t)[X (u − t)]
−1. The coeﬃcients in
(A54) are given by:
Q21 =
  1




















































































which completes the proof.
Proof for Lemma 6: Determining wealth and prices of equity and bond








































can be expanded into an exact ﬁnite series by virtue
of the binomial formula as in Equation (35) of the text. The overall calculation in this case is
greatly simpliﬁed. It leads to the prices of single-maturity claims (36), (37) and (43).40 The second
method is general in that it applies for any value of risk aversion. This method is the inverse Fourier











































































































Similarly, the share of consumption of Group A under the objective probability measure is:
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40The χ argument belongs to [0,1] allowing us to apply Lemma 1 to conclude that Hg is well deﬁned.
43Finally, we would like to consider only economies where the prices of perpetual claims are ﬁnite.
Because the prices of perpetual claims involve time integrals of (A58) and (A59) (or (36) and(37))
and these integrals have an inﬁnite upper bound, we need to check for convergence. The conditions
for convergence of prices are derived in the lemma below
Lemma 6 The growth conditions for the price of perpetual equity, F, and the price of the perpetual
bond, P, to be well deﬁned are, respectively:
G(α) < ρ and G(α − 1) < ρ, (A62)
where














  < 1, we can take Taylor series in (A23):










































Hg (b g,t,u;ε,χ). (A65)









exp[εb gB (χ;u − t)]. (A66)




























where the series converges uniformly.
Following the line of argument in Brennan and Xia (2001, Theorem 6)41 one can easily show








41To show that for integral (A68), one should additionally note that, because q,ζ > 0 and the series in (A67) is















are ﬁnite if and only if G(ε) − ρ < 0.
Assume ﬁrst that 1 − α ∈ N. Then (30) and (29) imply that the prices are well deﬁned as













ε = α for the stock and ε = α−1. Therefore, convergence of integral (A69) is a necessary condition
(because χ = 0 ∈ J) and convergence of integral (A68) is a suﬃcient condition (because Π ≤ Π)
for the prices to be well deﬁned. It only remains to notice that, for each price, these conditions are
identical and are given by (A62).











































































with its lower and upper bounds (A71) in the
expressions (29) and (30) for securities market prices and applying the above results for the case of
1 − α ∈ N, we obtain necessary (when the lower bound is substituted; χ = 0) and suﬃcient (when
the upper bound is substituted; χ =
j
1−[α], j = 0,...,1 − [α]) conditions for the prices to be well
deﬁned. The fact that, for each price, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions are identical and are
given by (A62) completes the proof.
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